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Paper presented at
Conference on Northeast Asian Security: Mixture of Traditional and Untraditional Security
jointly organized by
Renmin University, China
London School of Economics and Political Science, UK
University of Durham, UK
Free University Brussels, Belgium
2-3 April 2004, Beijing, China.
The Impact of U.S. Nuclear Policies on China
--A Political Perspective
During the cold war, the nuclear relations dominated the overall U.S.-Soviet relations and determined the main structure of this bilateral relationship. However, the situation between China and the United States after the end of the cold war is explicitly different from the U.S.-Soviet relations: there is no global competition between China and the United States; the two countries have broad economic, cultural and political exchanges and thriving civilian communications. The nuclear relationship does not have a dominant position in the overall Sino-U.S. relations. Nonetheless, it does not mean that nuclear issues are not important in the China-U.S. relationship.
The Taiwan issue has always been the most sensitive and important issue for the bilateral relationship and it could cause a serious confrontation between the two countries if not managed carefully. In this context, the effects of nuclear weapons can not be simply excluded. Nuclear issues could become very important if the Sino-U.S. relationship deteriorates because of Taiwan problem. In recent years, U.S. nuclear policies toward China had some negative changes. First, some US nuclear weapons that originally aimed at Russia were changed to target China[1]; Second, the opposing components kept increasing in the U.S. nuclear strategy. For example, the recent U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) lists China as one of the targets of its nuclear weapons and takes Taiwan Strait crisis as one contingency for using nuclear weapons.[2]
If these negative changes are further developed in the Sino-U.S. nuclear relationship, it will affect not only the overall Sino-U.S. relationship but also the security and stability of North East Asia. It is important to stabilize the Sino-U.S. nuclear relationship and to promote the cooperation between the two countries on nonproliferation and anti-terrorism. This will be helpful for maintaining North East Asia’s stability, especially for resolving the North Korean nuclear problem.
Ⅰ Introduction
The U.S. nuclear policies on China include two dimensions: rivalry and cooperative. The rivalry dimension refers to how the United States aims its nuclear weapons at China and how it plans to defend against Chinese nuclear weapons. The cooperative dimension refers to how the US works with China on safety, nonproliferation and antiterrorism in nuclear weapon areas. This paper studies both the two dimensions.
Through a careful review of the U.S. nuclear policies, we can find that the US nuclear policies on China have had some significant changes since China began to develop its own nuclear weapons. Today, the US nuclear policies on China are also very different from those on the former Soviet Union and the rogue states.
Lengthways, the U.S. nuclear policies on China mainly experienced three phases. In the first phase from 1960s to 1970s, the United States took China as one of its nuclear targets even before the Chinese first nuclear test[3], and adopted containment policy on China as it did on the Soviet Union; In the second phase from 1970s to early 1980s, the United States maintained a very low number of nuclear weapons targeting China; and in 1998-1999，the Pentagon put China back into the SIOP after a hiatus of about 20 years.[4] As the United States increased the opposing components in its nuclear policies on China by raising the number of nuclear weapons aimed at China, the cooperation between the two countries on nonproliferation has also been increasingly strengthened since the end of the 20th century, which added the cooperative aspect to U.S. nuclear policies on China. The policies today therefore have very complicated connotations. Accordingly, this paper will analyze the U.S. nuclear policies from both rivalry and cooperative dimensions.
Breadthwise, facing the Soviet huge nuclear arsenal, the United States adopted a strategy of mutual assured destruction during the cold war and took efforts in preventing the proliferation caused by possible loose control of Russia after the cold war. For those states of concerns (so called rogue states), the United States is determined to stop their development of nuclear weapons by means of nonproliferation regimes and preventive strikes. However, the declared U.S. nuclear policies on China are neither the same as those on the former Soviet Union (Russia) nor the same as on states of concerns. So we need to develop new approaches in analyzing the particularity of the US nuclear polices on China.
During the cold war, the United States and the Soviet Union had explicit understandings about the characteristics of each other’s nuclear arsenal so that their nuclear strategies were relatively clear and transparent. Tremendous research done in that period provide elaborate explanation about the structure and nature about US-Soviet nuclear relations. The approach they took, namely strategic approach, aims to find the elements that may stimulate the incentives of first nuclear strikes by calculating the consequences of nuclear exchanges. The strategic analyses offered some important policy recommendations about how to stabilize US-Soviet nuclear relationship. However, this approach does not seem to be so efficient in the Sino-U.S. context for the following reasons.
First, the US nuclear policies on China are based on it’s perspectives about China’s nuclear policies rather than the reality. As the Chinese nuclear deterrence partially comes from the quantitative ambiguity of its nuclear arsenal,[5] the U.S. nuclear policies on China, to a great degree, depend on the American-viewed images about China’s nuclear arsenal rather than the reality. As China’s economic capacity grows very fast recently, the images about the future of Chinese nuclear arsenal could become very frightening The concerns over future Chinese nuclear polices are supported by some more general worries that a rising China will finally resort to military power to change the present international order dominated by the United States and pose threat to the United States.[6] The US nuclear polices come from the American perspectives that may not correctly describe the reality in the Chinese nuclear policies. Consequently, the U.S. nuclear policies on China might be based on some misconceptions so the result deduced by strategic analysis may not tally the above.
Second, there is little relevance between the US nuclear policies on China and the Chinese nuclear capabilities. China’s nuclear arsenal kept unchanged during the last two decades, but the U.S. nuclear policies on China had some significant changes, for example, raising targets in China. Therefore, from the materialist perspective, it is difficult to explain the significant changes in the U.S. nuclear policies in the condition that little change happened in China’s nuclear capability. In another words, the U.S. nuclear policies on China always deviate from the framework of strategic analysis.
Third, some American scholars do not approve of the concepts based on strategic analysis and even consider it as the cold war mentality.[7]
We may need other approaches to think over the U.S. nuclear policies on China. Constructivism offers us a new approach, which is to analyze the U.S. nuclear policies on China by probing American security elite’s perspectives on China’s nuclear weapons and their policy suggestions.
Security elite refer to experts and officials who have important contributions to the security policies of a country. Because the opinions of American elite are the main sources of the U.S. nuclear policies, their perspectives, no matter consistent with reality or not, are the most important benchmarks in analyzing U.S. nuclear policies. Security elite include the officials in charge of security affairs in the government and the scholars working on security issues outside the government. Considering the possibility that the statements made by the officials in executive branches might not reflect their real positions because of governmental constraints, the paper mainly analyzes the views of non-governmental experts and the scholars at the research organizations affiliated to the government, and it does not count the viewpoints of the officials in executive branches unless for comparisons.
II American Security Elite’s Perspectives and Suggestions on China’s Nuclear Capability
On China’s present nuclear capability, the estimates of the U.S. security experts are very close to each others and generally believe that China now rests on the level of minimum nuclear deterrence[8]. While regarding the credibility of this deterrence[9], their opinions have some divergence[10].
Based on the estimation of the number and level of Chinese of nuclear weapons, most experts believe that “China developed nuclear weapons and a limited force to deliver them in order to prevent nuclear blackmail and to obtain greater international status and prestige. Its relatively small nuclear forces are intended for retaliation rather than a first strike. Beijing’s objective is nuclear deterrence: to convince potential enemies that enough of China’s strategic weapons would survive an attack to inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor in a retaliatory strike”[11]. This description is consistent with China’s declared nuclear strategy.[12] If the U.S. nuclear policies on China were indeed based on this kind of viewpoint, it should be easy for US and China to reach mutual understandings about strategic stabilities. However, what we have seen is that in recent years the United States adjusted its nuclear policies on China which apparently deviated from strategic stabilities. Actually the American perspectives on China’s future development of nuclear weapons are very divergent and therefore their policy recommendations about how to deal with future Chinese nuclear weapons brought great uncertainties and opposing elements in the US nuclear policies.
For the prospect of China’s future nuclear development, U.S. security elite fall into two different schools and their essential divarication lies in whether China will still be satisfied with maintaining the minimum nuclear deterrence. One school believes that “(China will develop) a posture of credible minimal deterrence with regard to the continental United States and Russia”[13]. At the same time, considering the fact that China has the capability to develop Multiple Independently-Targeting Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) but has not done so, the experts of this school therefore believe that China will maintain its minimum deterrence strategy in the future. The other school, however, worries about China’s intention of nuclear modernization and believes that “China’s nuclear modernization may be geared toward developing the capacity to move from a minimum deterrence to a limited deterrence nuclear strategy”[14]. Some experts in this school know that “minimum deterrence apparently remains the foundation of Beijing’s international doctrine at this time.”[15] But they also assert that “there are multiple signs of an increasingly vigorous debate on nuclear strategy. Moreover, new technical possibilities and perceived changes in China’s external environment may lead to a more differentiated strategy, including limited deterrence and nuclear counterforce missions”[16].
Bates Gill, a famous China expert, first expressed his viewpoint that China would stick to the minimum deterrence strategy in his article in 1999. Nevertheless, he changed his opinion soon in another article in 2001 and argued that China’s nuclear strategy would turn to limited nuclear deterrence. Actually, there had been no indications in these two years that China’s nuclear capability substantially changed or China decided to do so. But it seems the worries about nuclear threats from China has been growing in the United States and more Americans turned to believe that China would change its current nuclear strategy and adopt a more aggressive strategy.
Based on divergent predictions about China’s future nuclear capability and policies, the US security experts therefore have different suggestions on how to deal with China’s nuclear deterrence. Those who believe that the Chinese will become U.S. adversary suggest deploying NMD to suppress China’s determination of using military force on Taiwan[17] by trumping China’s nuclear deterrent capability. And those who believe that China pursues a kind of “nuclear sufficiency” principle like to determine U.S. policies on China based on how many nuclear warheads China is going to develop. They suggest the U.S. government to adopt some measures to deny the increase if they foresee and worry about possible increase of China’s nuclear warheads. If the number of Chinese nuclear weapons is in the “acceptable range” of the United States, they would suggest tolerating China’s nuclear deterrence. [18]
The first policy recommendation, namely capturing China’s deterrent, does not seem to be acceptable to China and it will make China and the United States more opposing to each other in nuclear area. The second recommendation leaves more space for China and the US to find a middle point. The key problem here is to figure out the US “acceptable range”, which is ambiguous and could be altered along with the changes in the U.S. capabilities and interests. So some more dialogues between the US and Chinese security experts are needed to seek compromises and paths led to greater strategic stabilities. Another important point here is that the lack of consensus among the U.S. security elite would make the U.S. nuclear policies vulnerable to uncertainties and accidents and would prevent the US side from taking active and constructive policies on China. So more discussions among the American security experts are also needed.
III American Security Elite’s Perspectives and Suggestions on China-U.S. Nuclear Cooperation
1. Nuclear Technology Sale & Control
The American perception about China’s behavior on nonproliferation experienced a process from completely negative to partly positive and then to mostly positive. In the early 1990s the United States was criticizing Chinese nuclear and missile transfers to the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia, and imposed a series of sanctions on Chinese companies for accused proliferation. During this era, the US experts widely believed that the motivations for Chinese proliferation activities in the 1980s included earning profits to support military modernization, increasing Chinese geopolitical influence in the Middle East and South Asia, and developing leverage to try to limit U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.[19] This view dominated U.S. opinion on China’s nonproliferation behavior at that time and was a contributing factor in the U.S. “China threat” debate.[20]
Since the 1990s, American perception on China’s nonproliferation policies began to change as they saw more Chinese cooperation with the United States on nonproliferation by accepting US led regimes. Some experts thought that “since the end of the Cold War, Beijing had made gradual yet significant progress in three key areas of its nonproliferation policy: joining major international arms control and nonproliferation treaties and conventions; reaching bilateral arrangements with the United States to adhere to missile and CBW nonproliferation standards; promulgating domestic export control regulations.” [21] It is worthy of mentioning that the security experts still hold suspicions on China though the number of international nonproliferation norms accepted by China was increasing.[22]
After China issued a series of new export control regulations that cover missile technology, chemical weapons precursors and technology, and biological agents in 2002, the American elite began to evaluate China’s policies positively. They believed that these regulations were accordant to the present regulations on WMD export control and particularly to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Australia Group (AG). Thereafter, the experts still doubted Chinese government’s capacity to enforce these regulations but approbated Chinese nonproliferation effort.[23] It seems that whether China accepts or participates in US-led nonproliferation regimes, e.g., the MTCR and AG, was an important criterion for judging Chinese nonproliferation performance.
Moreover, these experts all believed that it was U.S. pressure that brought China into global nonproliferation and they also believe that U.S. government would also play a major role in improving China’s capacity to turn its new regulations into an effective, functioning export control regime.[24]
2. North Korea Nuclear Issues
The Korea Peninsula attracts many countries’ attention for its special strategic position and is the intersection of the interests of some global and regional powers. Military confrontation was first formed in this area at the end of World War II and it was once escalated into a regional war. In early 1990s the North Korea nuclear issue arose and it added the complexity of the situation in this area. The United States has been very keen to solve this problem but the past efforts did not seem to be effective. American experts realized that the problem can not be solved by the United States alone. Tremendous American publications and internet articles suggest seeking for a multilateral strategy to deal with this problem and ask for Chinese further cooperation.[25]
These opinions were echoed by the U.S. policy-makers. Council Task Force on North Korea stated that “China has to take greater responsibility to convince North Korea to stop its nuclear program…The administration has been correct to emphasize China in its North Korea diplomacy and should continue positive efforts to enlist Beijing’s support. Any negotiations with North Korea must have China’s support”.[26]
The first and second round of six-party talks took place in Beijing on August 27th 2003 and February 25th 2004, which fully demonstrates Chinese important role and continuous efforts on this issue. On Korean nuclear issue, American security elite have a consensus that the United States should work with China. This partly constitutes the epistemic basis for the second dimension of the U.S. nuclear policies, and is beneficial for moving the China-U.S. nuclear relationship to the positive side of the ledger.
3. Cooperation on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Technologies
China-U.S. cooperation on peaceful use of nuclear technologies has always been a vulnerable field. Many cooperative programs in this area were often interrupted or suspended by political attacks. The cases of Wen Ho Lee and Peter Lee and the Cox Report all lend evidences to that. Some American politicians and their assistants believed that China stole a large amount of information on nuclear weapon and missile technology from the United States, which improved the Chinese nuclear capabilities greatly in a very short time, and therefore hurts the the U. S. national security.[27]
On the contrary, criticism of the report shows us another perspective on China-U.S. nuclear cooperation. Shortly after the report came out, some experts argued that “the report…is clearly designed to hype a new Chinese nuclear missile threat rather than objectively examine the extent and implications of alleged Chinese nuclear espionage…this extreme worst-case assessment is grossly misleading and threatens rational U.S. diplomatic and defense policy toward Beijing.”[28] Moreover, an expert oppugned the report convincingly through his strategic analysis. He pointed out that even if China obtained the information on U.S. thermonuclear weapons as accused by Cox Report, it would not impair U.S. security because it does not make sense for China to apply the information on Chinese ICBM design.[29] Unfortunately, such counterviews did not prevent the tidal wave caused by Cox Report from disturbing US-China nuclear cooperation. For example, the China-US lab-lab cooperation was suspended soon after Cox Report was issued.[30] This also sets obstacles for China-U.S. cooperation in other fields and politically poses bad shadows to the overall Sino-US relations.
IV Conclusion
The security policies of a country directly come from its security elite’s perceptions about the security environment and their policies recommendations. If there is consensus among the elite, it will lead to a more stable and coherent policy. For example, before the United States took active strategic arms control policies with the former Soviet Union, the American security elite reached consensuses on all important points on strategic stabilities.[31] If the options of the elite diverge too much, the policies would be unstable and vulnerable to accidents. This general conclusion can also apply to the U.S. nuclear policies on China.
As forementioned, the American perceptions about Chinese nonproliferation policies, e.g., export control and North Korea nuclear issue, are tending to be more consistent with each other and this will encourage the U.S. government to stick to a more cooperative policy on China in this area. However, in other nuclear areas, namely the Sino-US strategic nuclear relations and their cooperation on peaceful use of nuclear technologies, the American perceptions are very divergent. This would pose serious problems if the U.S. government plans to adopt rational and constructive policies on China.
The most serious problem is that American security elite have very divergent opinions about China’s future nuclear capability. The divergence of the perspectives is sometimes translated as a term of “uncertain threats”, for example, some American experts stated that “China’s uncertain threat to the United States would be more serious than that of Russia”.[32] This, to some extent, would mislead the US nuclear policies and make the rivalry dimension of the policies less stable. As the US currently have had tremendous surplus in its nuclear arsenals, it needs either to get rid of them or to find new targets for them. If American perspectives further diverge, it would drive the U.S. to transfer the reduced nuclear weapons to targeting China and to make more hostile U.S. nuclear policies toward China. At the same time, the warning that “how to deter regional ‘rogue powers’ (including China) will be more difficult in the second nuclear era”[33] would also the opposing contents in the U.S. nuclear policies on China.
The U.S. NMD deployment is a new element that concerns China about the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrence. The U.S. side might worry that China intends to largely develop its nuclear weapons so as to obtain more capabilities to threaten and challenge the United States. The mistrust and suspicions between China and the United States is a severe impediment for the positive development of the Sino-U.S. nuclear relationship.
In order to avoid the bilateral relationship falling into a security dilemma, both countries need to make more efforts. First, more concrete discussions are needed in the United States to form certain consensus among the American security elite, which will contribute to establishing some stable and constructive U.S. nuclear policies on China; second, it is necessary to increase dialogues and communications to remove the mistrust between the two states and establish a stable and favorable Sino-U.S. nuclear relationship. For realizing this, China needs to be more transparent in the nuclear realm and the United States needs to support the dialogues and communications, and prevent the negative events such as the Cox Report from happening. More importantly, if the United States can stick to the “one-China” principle and observe its commitments on Taiwan issue, the instability of the overall Sino-U.S. nuclear relationship will be decreased to its minimum. The China-US nuclear relationship will therefore have a favorable foundation for its future development.
+ Graduate Student, Arms Control Program, Institute of International Studies, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China.
* Professor and Director of Arms Control Program, Institute of International Studies, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China.
[1] Jon Dougherty, “WARS AND RUMORS OF WARS U.S. to target China with nukes Will turn weapons toward Asian power, away from Russia,” September 5, 2001. http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=24340.
[2] “Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts],” 8 January 2002, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm.
[3] Hans M. Kristensen, “The Awakening Asian Tiger China in US Nuclear Planning,” a working paper, The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, November 2000, p.3. http://www.nautilus.org/enviro/beijing2k/ChinaNuke.pdf
[4] Bruce Blair, “START III, Nuclear War Plans and the Cold War Mindset,” http://www.cdi.org/dm/2000/issue5/Start.html
[5] For a more detailed discussion about the quantitative ambiguity of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, see Li Bin, ‘China’s nuclear disarmament policy’, ed. H. A. Feiveson, The Nuclear Turning Point—A Bluepoint for Deep Cuts and De-Alerting of Nuclear Weapons (Brookings Institution Press: Washington, DC, 1999), pp. 325–32.
[6] On this point, see David M. Edelstein, “American Images of a Rising China: Lessons from History and Theory,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, www.csis.org/isp/ch_amer_imagination/021210_edelstein.pdf; Melana Zyla Vickers, “Red Tiger Rising: China Preparations For War With The United States,” August 14, 2002. http://capmag.com/article.asp?ID=1800; and Robert Sutter, “Why Does China Matter?”, The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2003-04, www.twq.com/04winter/docs/04winter_sutter.pdf
[7] The discussion about strategic analysis and political analysis, see Li Bin, Wu Rui, “The Impact of US Regional and Global Nuclear Policies on China,” Workshop on Promoting Global Disarmament through East Asian Nuclear Threat Reduction, March 11-12, 2004, Hiroshima, Japan.
[8] Minimum deterrence means that nuclear weapons are used only for deterring other coutries’ nuclear attack, and the number will only meet the requirement of deterring other countries’ nuclear attack.
[9] Credible deterrence means that country A’s long-range nuclear force could not be saturated by country B’s preemptive strike. At least a few of country A’s ICBMs or Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) would be able to survive a country B’s preemptive strike and could be used in a retaliatory strike no matter how well country B measures the total number of country A’s nuclear weapons.
[10] Wu Rui, “American Perspectives about Chinese Nuclear Policy: Report of the Interviews in Washington D.C.,” http://learn.tsinghua.edu.cn/homepage/S00313/index.htm
[11] “Annual Report On the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China”, Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act，Section 1202, Department of Defense, June 2000, p.20. www.csis.org/burke/mb/asia_neac_dod_china.pdf
[12] See “VII.Arms Control and Disarmament” in “White Paper on China’s National Defense in 2002,” http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/features/ndpaper2002/nd7.html
[13] Bates Gill and James Mulvenon, “China and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implications for the United States,” 5 November 1999, p.5. www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/conference_reports/weapons_mass_destruction.html
[14] Alastair Iain Johnston, “Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence Versus Multilateral Arms Control,” China Quarterly, June 1996, pp.552-558.
[15] Roberts A. Manning et al., “China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control: A Preliminary Assessment”, p.87. www.cfr.org/pdf/china.pdf
[16] Ibid.
[17] Alexander T. J. Lennon, ed. Contemporary Nuclear Debates: Missile Defense, Arms Control and Arms Races in the Twenty-First Century, (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2002), p.25.
[18] About the different suggestions on how to deal with China’s nuclear deterrence, see Wu Rui, “American Perspectives about Chinese Nuclear Policy: Report of the Interviews in Washington D.C.,” http://learn.tsinghua.edu.cn/homepage/S00313/index.htm
[19] R. Bates Gill, Chinese Arms Transfers: Purposes, Patterns and Prospects in the New World Order (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1992).
[20] See Evan S. Medeiros, “China, WMD Proliferation, and the ‘China Threat’ Debate,” Issue & Studies 36 (January/February 2000), pp.19-48.
[21] Jing-dong Yuan, “The Evolution of China’s Nonproliferation Policy since ht 1990s: Progress, Problems, and Prospects,” Journal of Contemporary China 11 (May 2002), pp.209-233.
[22] On this point, see Jing-dong Yuan, Phillip C. Saunders, and Stephanie Lieggi, “Recent Developments in China’s Export Controls: New Regulations and New Challenges,” The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002, pp.154-155.
[23] Ibid, p.153.
[24] Ibid, p.166.
[25] See, for example, Moon Hayong, “Korean Nuclear Crisis: Benefits of a Multilateral Approach,” March 20, 2003. www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0322A_Hayong.html; Ashton B. Carter, “The Korean Nuclear Crisis: Preventing the truly dangerous spread of weapons of mass destruction,” www.harvard-magazine.com/on-line/090326.html; and Scott Snyder, “Regime Change and Another Nuclear Crisis,” www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0301Qchina_skorea.html.
[26] To Stop North Korea's Nuclear Program, U.S. Must Make Genuine Commitment to Talks, Repair U.S.-South Korea Alliance, Get China to Take Greater Role, Concludes Council Task Force on North Korea，Ambassadors James Laney and Mort Abramowitz with Council Fellow Eric Heginbotham at the May 19,2003 meeting and press conference of the Council-sponsored Independent Task Force on Korea. www.cfr.org/publication.php?id=5972
[27] For a detailed description of these viewpoints, see “General Overview”, “Chapter 1: PRC Acquisition of U.S. Technology”, and “Chapter 2: PRC Theft of U.S. Nuclear Warhead Design Information” of “Report of the Selected Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/ Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, submitted by Mr. Cox of California, Chairman”, www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/hr105851
[28] Spurgeon M. Keeny, Hyping Chinese Espionage,” Arms Control Today, April/May 1999. www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_04-05/focam99.asp.
[29] Richard L. Garwin, “Why China Won’t Build U.S. Warheads,” Arms Control Today, April/May 1999. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_04-05/rgam99.asp
[30] Li Bin, “China and Nuclear Transparency,” in Nicholas Zarimpas ed., “Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials: The Political and Technical Dimensions”, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, pp.50-57.
[31] More discussion about the role of epistemic group, see Emanuel Adler, “The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control,” International Organization, Vol.46, No.1, Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination (Winter, 1992), pp.101-145.
[32] James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations:
A Comprehensive Survey, 5th ed., (Addison Wesley Longman, Inc., 2002). (Chinese version
translated by Yan Xuetong, et al., World Affairs Press, 2003), p.422.
[33] Ibid, p.424.