U.S.-Japan Cooperation on Theater Missile Defense

    On August 16, the United States (U.S.) and Japanese defense officials announced signing of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to conduct joint research on naval theater missile defense technology.  The cooperation will reportedly focus on the U.S. Navy Theater Wide (NTW) missile defense program.[1] The two countries, according to the MOU, will develop four major components of the NTW guided missiles: the sensor, advanced kinetic warhead, second stage propulsion and lightweight nose cone.  The research and design work will last at least three years.  The U.S.-Japan project of joint research on the Navy Theater Wide missiles poses a serious problem in the compliance of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).  It also adds more to China's concerns over missile defense and military buildup in Japan.

    China has been rejecting missile defense in Japan since this issue appeared because China believes that missile defense in Japan will disturb regional stability.[2] The Chinese also worry that Japan would develop its weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.  The accumulation of plutonium and the development of solid-fuel rockets has given Japan a potential to develop nuclear weapons and missiles to carry them.[3] Japan's refusal of apologizing to its neighboring countries for its invasion in and before World War II has increased the threat perceptions of these countries.  The development of anti-missile by Japan would (1) politically encourage Japan to go further in the direction of military buildup; (2) increase Japan's defensive forces while it holds a huge potential to develop offensive forces and (3) provide Japan with an excuse and an opportunity it did not have before to exercise and improve its missile technology publicly.  The U.S.-Japan joint research on the NTW missile will certainly be regarded by China as serious challenge to China's national security.  This issue is now coupled with the MTCR compliance.  If the U.S. wants China to fully accept the MTCR including its annexes as China's export control law, the U.S. will have to convince China that this joint research is in compliance with the MTCR.
 

The NTW Capabilities and The MTCR Limitations

    According to the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO),[4] the Navy Theater-Wide (NTW) theater ballistic missile defense program will provide an exo-atmospheric sea-based capability to counter medium/long range theater ballistic missile threats.  A NTW interceptor will probably consist of an improved Standard Missile, (the SM-3, or SM-2 Block-4), an modified MK-41 Vertical Launching System and an LEAP (Lightweight Exo-Atmospheric Projectile) anti-missile.  The NTW system includes NTW interceptors, an SPY-B radar, an AEGIS fleet carrying the interceptors and the radar, and some other C3I systems supporting the system.

    The NTW interceptor is reportedly to have a speed of 4.5 kilometers per second at burnout.  If it is launched in the way of surface-to-surface missiles, the NTW interceptor will have a range of about 2500 kilometers.  The Standard Missiles are designed as dual-use missiles: surface-to-air missiles and surface-to-surface missiles.[5] So, an NTW interceptor, that uses a Standard Missile as its major part, should not be difficult to be launched in the way of surface-to-surface missiles.  The parameters of the Standard Missiles are given in Table 1.

Table 1, Parameters of Standard Serial Missiles[6]
 

Type of Missiles	SM -1 MR	SM-2 MR	SM Extended Range
Length (meters)	4.41	4.41	7.9
Diameter (centimeters)	34.3	34.3	34.3
Launch Weight (kilograms)	495	621	1341

    The MTCR strongly forbids the transfer of technology of missiles that can fly over 300 kilometers with a payload of 500 kilograms.  To check the compliance of the transfer of the NTW system with MTCR, we need to calculate the range of the NTW interceptor if it carries a 500-kilogram payload instead of a LEAP Kinetic Killing Vehicle (KKV).  Since some parameters of the NTW interceptor are not yet publicly available and therefore some eductional guesses have to be made to describe the capabilities of the NTW interceptor.  By using an NTW model[7] provided by Dr. David Wright of Union of Concerned Scientists, the calculation gives the following result if the NTW interceptor carries a 500-kilograms payload instead of a LEAP KKV.

         Burnout speed: 1.42 kilometers/seconds;
         Burnout altitude: 54 kilometers;
         And range: 261 kilometers.

    This calculation shows that the range of the NTW interceptor is close to 300 kilometers when it carries a 500-kilogram payload.  If we consider the model uncertainties and some simple upgrade of the propulsion system, it is possible that the NTW interceptor and its subsystems should be identified as Category I items of the MTCR.  So, the transfer of the NTW interceptor or its technology raises a serious problem in the MTCR compliance.

    If a country wants to use the NTW interceptor to carry weapons of mass destruction weighing 500 kilograms, there are two factors that are unfavorable to this effort. The first factor is aerodynamic instability caused by the shift of weight center.  It could cause aerodynamic instability if the light payload of LEAP KKV is replaced with a heavy payload of 500 kilograms.  However, the factor of aerodynamic instability is not a crucial one and it cannot kill the effort in using the NTW interceptor as surface-to-surface missile.  Aerospace instability may reduce the accuracy of the missile or may make the missile tumbling after the boost phase of the flight.  But the warhead can keep flying to reach the designed range without serious problem.  For example, the Iraqis changed the design of the Scud missile as Al Hussein missile to extend its range and this caused aerodynamic instability.  No evidence shows that the Al Hussein missiles have any difficulty to reach their designed ranges due to aerodynamic instability.  The second unfavorable factor is size-mismatching.  The NTW interceptor (or Standard Missile) has a relatively small diameter comparing to most surface-to-surface missiles with ranges of 300 kilometers.  For chemical and biological warheads, there is no problem of size-mismatching because their shapes could be made to match thin missiles without big difficulties.  A gun-type nuclear warhead does not have the problem either because it could be designed to be thin too.  For example, the gun-type U.S. W33 warhead has a diameter of 0.40 meter, that is comparable to that of the Standard Missile.[8] Implosive nuclear warheads could have such problem.  An implosive nuclear warhead weighing 500 kilograms is estimated to have a diameter of 0.58--0.76 meters, that is greater than that of the NTW interceptor.[9] So, the NTW interceptor has the problem of size-mismatching if it carries implosive nuclear warhead weighing 500 kilograms.  However, size-mismatching is not a deadly problem for the NTW interceptor to carry a big payload.  The main consequence of size-mismatching is aerodynamic instability too.  As discussed above, aerodynamic instability cannot stop the effort in delivering the big payload to designed range.
 

Legal Aspects of The MTCR Compliance

    The Missile Technology Control Regime is an export control document shared by some countries including the United States and Japan as their domestic law.  The purpose of the MTCR is to prevent the spread of missiles capable of bringing weapons of mass destruction for a certain range.  Missiles that can deliver at least 500 kilograms payload for at least 300 kilometers, and their important subsystems and technology are identified as Category I items of the MTCR.  Missiles that have ranges larger than 300 kilometers with any payloads and some other less sensitive equipment and technologies are identified as Category II items of the MTCR.  Category I items are strongly denied for export and category II items are examined case by case to deny export if their end-uses are not guaranteed.  If the range of the NTW interceptor is about 300 kilometers or greater when it carries a 500-kilogram payload, it should be identified as a Category I item and the joint NTW research is therefor a violation of the MTCR.  The calculation in the last section shows that the range is very close to 300 kilometers.  If more information about the NTW interceptor is available, the conclusion will be more accurate.  If the range of the NTW interceptor is much less than 300 kilometers when it brings a 500-kilogram payload, it can be identified as a Category II item because the NTW interceptor has a range of about 2500 kilograms when it brings a payload as heavy as the LEAP KKV.  In this case, the joint NTW research should still be denied because the end-use of the NTW technology is difficult to be verified.

    There might be some arguments claiming that the joint NTW research does not violate the MTCR.  The first argument believes that the MTCR allows its "members" to share missile technology.  This is a widely believed argument, but it is a misunderstanding of the MTCR.  The fact is that the MTCR does not distinguish "members" and "non-members" at all in its content.  If the MTCR allowed its "members" to share missile technology, any enlargement of the MTCR community would mean encouraging the proliferation of missile technology.  The origin of this misunderstanding came from some U.S. laws of implementing the MTCR.  These laws allow waving the sanctions over transfer of missile technology if the recipients of the technology are MTCR partner countries.[10] This is a reservation of the U.S. to the MTCR that leaves a loophole of the MTCR implementation in the U.S. and it sets a bad norm of missile technology transfer among MTCR partner countries.  The U.S.-Japanese joint research on NTW may not violate the U.S. law, but it probably violates the MTCR.

    The second argument is that the end-use of the jointly developed NTW technology will be verified, so the transfer of these items is not a violation of the MTCR.  The MTCR calls for strong presumption to deny the transfer of Category I items regardless of their purpose.  If the NTW interceptor can deliver a 500-kilogram payload for about 300 kilograms or greater, it will be identified as a Category I item and the transfer of its technology will be regarded as MTCR violation no matter what mission the NTW system is designed to have.  If the range of the NTW interceptor is much less than 300 kilometers when it carries a 500-kilogram payload, the possibility of MTCR violation cannot be simply excluded by end-use assurance either.  The reason is that the end-use of transferred technology can never be verified well.  The verification of the end-use of some transferred hardware may be possible while the verification of the end-use of data or knowledge is very difficult.  People may even not be able to get any early warning if either side of the U.S. and Japan converts the knowledge learned from joint NTW research into designing surface-to-surface missiles.  So, we cannot expect reliable and effective end-use verification arrangement in the joint NTW research.

    Obviously, the joint U.S.-Japanese NTW study has posed a big challenge to the MTCR compliance even though the U.S. law may not forbid this activity.
 

Conclusions and Discussions

 Although the United States has its own reservation to the MTCR, it is urgently pushing more countries including China to fully accept the MTCR as their export control law.[11] There is no doubt that China is watching the MTCR implementation closely.  So, it is a very bad time for the U.S. signed an MOU at this moment with Japan to jointly develop anti-missile technology that probably violates the MTCR.  This is certainly a big concern of China.  A spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry commented on the MOU before it was signed and China believes that it is harmful to regional security.[12]  If the U.S. and Japan cannot convince China that the joint research complies with the MTCR, it would have a negative impact on China's attitude towards the MTCR.  China would have to draw a conclusion from this event that the MTCR and its current implementation system would constrain China rather than protect China's security.  If the MTCR cannot bring security benefit to China, it is unimaginable that China will be happy to adopt the whole MTCR as China's domestic law.

    In our analysis, there are some uncertainties about the range of the NTW interceptor because the publicly available information about the NTW system is not sufficient.  If more information is provided, it will help make more accurate judgment about the MTCR compliance of the joint NTW research.  An U.S. defense official said that ". . . these (NTW systems) are defensive systems and we are being very transparent with countries in the region about our work here."[13] To respond to China's concern over the U.S.-Japanese joint NTW project, the U.S. and Japan should provide transparency of the project in the region of East Asia as they promised so that China can review the joint NTW project according to the MTCR criteria.  If the final conclusion is that the project violates the MTCR, the U.S. and Japan should consider terminating the project immediately if they want to sustain or enhance the MTCR.
 

End notes:
This work is supported by the Ploughshares Fund.
[1] "U.S., Japan ink plan to cooperate on Navy TMD," Aerospace Daily, August 17, 1999.  Vol. 191, No. 33; p. 251.
[2] see, for example, the Speech of PRC Delegation to the ASEAN Forum on TMD, March 5, 1999. Bangkok.  http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/c/c/ccbe.htm
[3] see, for example, Liu Cheng'an, "The Enlargement of Japan's Potential Nuclear Capabilities and Its Impact on The Security in the Asian-Pacific Area", in the Collection of Arms Control Papers of PSNSS, 1996 Janurary.
[4] Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, "FY 1998 President's Budget Press Release" http://www.smdc.army.mil/presbudget.html
[5] "Navy Fact File: Standard Missile," http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/missiles/wep-stnd.html
[6] see endnote 5
[7] David Wright, Private Communication.
[8] Cochran, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. I, U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities, p. 47.
[9] Li Bin, "Nuclear Missile Delivery Capabilities in Emerging Nuclear States", Science & Global Security, 1997, Vol. 6, pp. 311-331.
[10] For example, The 1991 FY U.S. National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 101-510).
[11] Howard Diamond, "U.S. Renews Effort to Bring China into Missile Control Regime", Arms Control Today, March 1998.
[12] Zhang Qiyue, Spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry,  Press Conference , June 29, 1999.  http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/c/b/cb1999/cb199900629.htm
[13] "United States, Japan Finalize Deal On Navy Theater Wide Cooperation," Inside Missile Defense, August 25, 1999.  Vol. 5, No. 17.